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Abstract
Th e socio-political unrest known as the “Arab Spring” has left its imprint on the tourism sector of the Arab 
region. Th is paper explores fi rst the eff ects of the Arab Spring on the macro-tourism performance of selected 
Arab countries, both oil and non-oil, using offi  cial tourism and macro-economic statistical data. Subsequently, 
it examines the policies and strategies adopted by the Arab governments in order to mitigate the evolving 
tourism crisis in the non-oil Arab states. Finally, it examines the relationships between the Non –oil and 
GCC countries with respect to the tourism trends characterizing the Arab World since the outbreak of the, 
so-called, Arab Spring.  It concluded that the tourism “pain” of the non-oil Arab countries became the “gain” 
of the GCC countries, which have been perceived by both intra-regional and international tourists as safer 
to visit. Th e paper concludes with an evaluation of the future tourism prospects for both the non-oil and 
the GCC countries. Assuming that the socio-political unrest accompanied by safety and security threat to 
tourists in some of the non-oil Arab countries will prevail at least in the foreseeable future, the paper points 
at further research directions in order to monitor these future trends.
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Introduction
Th e Arab Spring, which broke out in late 2010, has had a tremendous impact on the tourism indus-
try in the entire Arab region, in the non-oil and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alike. Th ere are several 
research questions, which need to be asked regarding the consequences of this change: fi rst, what were 
the eff ects of the Arab Spring on the tourism industry – both of the non-oil and the GCC countries 
alike? Second, to what extent are these eff ects signifi cantly diff erent from those associated with previous 
tourism crises in this part of the world (e.g. the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the terror-
ist attacks on tourists in Egypt in November 1997, Th e US invasion of Iraq in March 2003? and the 
Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006)? Th ird, are there diff erences in tourism consequences 
between oil- and non-oil Arab countries and, if so, in what way? Fourth, what crisis management 
strategies and tactics were adopted by the Arab governments to mitigate the consequent negative 
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tourism eff ects? And lastly, what are the prospects for the tourism industry both in the GCC and the 
non-oil Arab countries in light of the continuing global economic recession on the one hand and the 
continuation of political instability in an increasing number of non-oil Arab countries on the other? 
In accordance with the above questions, the paper proceeds with a theoretical framework drawn on 
nature of tourism crises in developing and developed economies. It then examines trends of the Arab 
tourism industry since the early 2000s and until the onset of the Arab Spring. Th is is followed by 
an examination of the eff ects of the Arab Spring on the tourism industry. Th e paper then explores 
the unique characteristics of the tourism crisis resulting from the Arab Spring compared to previous 
tourism crises in the Arab region. Th is is followed by an analysis of the measures taken by the Arab 
governments in pursuit of tourism recovery. Finally, the paper examines the future prospects of the 
tourism industry in the whole Arab region.
Theoretical framework: Tourism crises and their nature
Th e relationship between tourism and issues of safety and security has aroused considerable interest 
and research, especially since the mid-1980s. Since then, major incidents involving security and safety 
around the world have intensifi ed this interest and brought about not only a documentation of the 
relationship and the magnitude of the impact on the international tourism industry, but have also 
sought strategies to manage and mitigate the consequences of such turbulences in tourism (Laws, 2007). 
In many tourism destinations, major crises in the wake of security and instability situations were rare 
or at least sporadic, causing limited and short-term damage to the tourism sector. However, in other 
places, such as Israel, Lebanon, Yemen, Lebanon or Sri Lanka, tourism crises in the wake of security 
and safety situations have become chronic (Mansfeld, 1999). In such circumstances, an on-going 
crisis management mode of operation is required, one that can deal with complex operational and 
marketing constraints on the destinations concerned. Th e cost involved in operating tourism systems 
in such unstable environs raises a major dilemma, asking whether tourism as an economic sector can 
perform profi tably (Beirman, 2009).
In many countries, tourism has become one of the more prominent earners of foreign currency, a lead-
ing contributor to GDP, in some of them even double-digit fi gures; and, most important, the major 
generator of private sector employment. Furthermore, tourism in such countries has become almost the 
sole economic and social mechanism to reduce rapid urbanization processes and to facilitate a decent 
standard of living in peripheral areas. In the Arab region, this is the case in Aqaba (Jordan), Sinai and 
the Red Sea (Egypt) as well as in many tourist destinations in Tunisia and Morocco, all of which are 
totally dependent on tourism. 
Hence, tourism crises in such areas, especially when they recur, may cause serious socioeconomic 
problems. Furthermore, tourism crises may have long-term ramifi cations on their competitiveness 
since these places can easily be replaced by non-aff ected destinations that off er similar tourist products 
(Shoukry, 2013). Th us, for example, countries such as Tunisia and Egypt that specialize in Triple-S 
tourism, may fi nd it extremely hard to regain fl ows of tourists since these countries have been replaced 
by stable, secure and similarly attractive alternative destinations, namely Turkey, Greece and Cyprus 
(Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006). 
137-268 Tourism 2015 02EN.indd   206 27.5.2015.   12:00:01
207TOURISM ReviewYoel Mansfeld / Onn Winckler
Vol. 63/ No. 2/ 2015/ 205 - 223
Th e nature of tourism crises portrayed above make the task of overcoming them a complex and chal-
lenging endeavor. In order to better tailor the right recovery strategies for each tourism crisis, one should 
analyze and understand the characteristics of the security situation, the characteristics of the country’s 
markets, the profi le of the local tourism system, in addition to previously taken measures to manage 
and mitigate past crises in that country. Th ese perspectives will be used here in reviewing the anatomy 
and the consequences of tourism crises incurred as an outcome of the Arab Spring.
Th is paper analyzes the tourism ramifi cations of the Arab Spring from a macro-economic perspective. 
Hence, the analysis will be using statistics collected from the offi  cial statistical authorities of the coun-
tries being researched as well as “grey” sources collected from economic newspapers, media reports and 
other unoffi  cial sources. Th e data collected and compiled have allowed a broad view of the economic, 
social and political implications of the developments in the tourism industry in each country. Th ey 
have also provided a regional view enabling a macro-collective analysis of the ramifi cations in all the 
analyzed countries together.  
Findings and analysis 
Following is presentation of the fi ndings and analysis of the based on the secondary data collected for 
each reviewed state.  Th e discussion is organized according with the research issues presented in the 
introduction
Trends in the Arab tourism industry 
prior to the “Arab Spring” 
Like many other developing economies worldwide, the non-oil Arab countries started to develop a 
tourism sector in the 1970s, fi rst in Egypt and Tunisia, and then expanded rapidly into other non-oil 
Arab countries. Th is trend continued steadily with only minor disruptions until the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring. Th us, in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, the tourism industry has become the largest 
private sector employer and the most important earner of hard currency (Tang & Abosedra, 2014).
In the case of Tunisia, for example, in 2010 the tourism industry constituted 6.5% of the GDP and 
provided employment to 11.5% of the workforce (Kan, 2012; WTTC, Tunisia, 2012). Th e direct 
contribution of the tourism industry to the Tunisian economy increased from US$ 2,0 billion in 2000 
to US$ 3,8 billion in 2010 (see Table 1). Th e success of the Tunisian tourism industry until the onset 
of the Arab Spring was based not only on its diverse products (from traditional “Triple-S” to desert 
tourism and cultural tourism focusing on archaeological sites) but also on the European-secular and 
permissive nature of the country – an imprint of the prolonged French colonial rule (Achy, 2012; 
Tunis Times, April 14, 2013).
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Table 1
Direct contribution of tourism to the GDP of selected oil-and non-oil Arab countries, 2000-2014  
(selected years, US$ billion, current prices)
Year /Country 2000 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Non-oil Arab countries ( under the new regime)
Egypt 6,702 7,381 9,651 14,448 15,504 17,505 15,023 17,710 14,473 16,548
Tunisia 1,976 2,575 3,187 4,094 3,796 3,760 3,142 3,424 3,396 3,614
Non-oil Arab countries ( under the old regime)
Jordan 0,445 0,681 0,953 1,369 1,331 1,684 1,692 2,015 2,022 2,221
Morocco 2,365 4,603 6,672 8,550 8,039 8,144 9,027 8,561 8,548 8,559
Oil-rich Arab countries
Qatar 0,339 0,801 1,524 1,434 1,239 1,420 2,299 3,269 3,745 4,244
Bahrain 0,576 1,015 1,247 1,377 1,384 1,591 1,287 1,269 1,353 1,447
Oman 0,483 0,732 0,802 1,241 1,094 1,233 1,512 1,710 1,954 1,990
Saudi Arabia 6,284 11,135 9,751 13,759 13,898 16,454 17,008 17,523 17,388 18,242
UAE 2,975 3,830 6,982 12,635 10,627 11,823 13,521 14,862 15,856 16,762
Source: World Travel & Tourism Council.
In Egypt, also, tourism rapidly emerged as the leading industry. By 2010, the industry employed approxi-
mately 10% of the total workforce (African Development Bank, 2012). Th e total direct contribution 
of tourism to the Egyptian economy increased from $6,6 billion in 2000 to as high as $17,5 billion in 
2010 (see Table 1). Th e combination of Egypt’s unique archaeological-cultural-religious sites, its desert 
and ecotourism opportunities, its Red Sea scuba diving attractions, and the vast range of Triple-S sites 
with low-cost tourism services, all transformed Egypt into a popular tourism destination worldwide.
Since signing its peace accords with Israel (October 1994) and until the onset of the Arab Spring, 
Jordan’s tourism industry also fl ourished. By 2010, the direct contribution of the tourism industry 
to the GDP amounted to $1,7 billion – almost four times the amount when compared to 2000 (see 
Table 1; Hazbun, 2002). It appears that the Jordanian National Tourism Strategy for the 2004-2010 
period had succeeded and had brought the Kingdom’s tourism industry to a peak (ABC Investments, 
2009). In 2010, following a slight decline in 2009 as a consequence of the global economic recession, 
Jordan’s receipts for tourism were higher than ever before, amounted to $4,39 billion (World Bank 
Data, International Tourism Receipts). Overall, during the 2004-2010 period, Jordan’s tourism receipts 
increased by as much as 257% (Jordan, Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities – MTA, 2011a).
Also among the other non-oil Arab countries tourism has emerged as a leading sector, even in Syria, 
which until the late 1980s did little to promote this industry. Since the early 2000s, however, Syria’s 
tourism industry rapidly expanded, particularly during the three years preceding the political unrest, 
which started in March 2011. In 2010, that country’s tourism industry constituted approximately 
12% of the GDP and was responsible for 11% of the employment opportunities (Th e Daily Star, 
2012; Ibrahim & Razzouk, 2011). 
In the GCC countries, with the exception of the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, tourism as a modern 
industry almost did not exist until recently. Th e avoidance of tourism development by these countries 
was mainly due to the authorities’ fear of widespread illegal labor immigration (Mansfeld & Winckler, 
2007). Th is fear was accompanied with a concern over possible negative cultural impacts as highly 
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conservative host communities may have encountered Western, non-Muslim international mass tour-
ists (Jafari & Scott, 2014). 
Th is policy of avoiding the tourism sector, however, ended in Dubai and Bahrain during the 1980s, 
and in Oman and Abu Dhabi during the 1990s. Saudi Arabia followed in 2000 and recently also Qatar 
turned to a process of massive and rapid tourism development. Th e development of the tourism sec-
tor was part of their paramount aim to develop the non-oil sectors (Johnson, 2010). Overall, as can 
be observed from Tables 1 and 2, during the 2000s the tourism industry in the Arab region rapidly 
developed in the oil and the non-oil economies alike. Tourism performance at that time exceeded by 
far those of worldwide averages. It should be noted, however, that this rapid development also occurred 
in 2009 and 2010 despite the on-going global economic recession.
Table 2
Number of international tourist arrivals in some Arab countries, 2000-2013 (000’)
Year /
Country
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Non-oil Arab countries (under the new regime)
Egypt 5,116 4,357 4,906 5,746 7,795 8,244 10,610 12,296 11,914 14,051 9,497 11,196 9,174
Tunisia 5,058 5,387 5,064 5,114 5,998 6,378 6,762 7,049 6,901 6,903 4,785 5,950 6,269
Non-oil Arab countries ( under the old regime)
Jordan 1,427 1,478 1,622 2,353 2,853 2,987 3,431 3,729 3,789 4,207 3,960 4,162 3,945
Morocco 4,240 4,342 4,303 4,761 5,477 5,843 7,408 7,879 8,341 9,288 9,342 9,375 10,046
Oil-rich Arab countries
Qatar 587 557 587 557 732 913 964 1,405 1,659 1,519 2,527 1,170 – 
Dubai * – – 4,756 4,980 5,431 6,160 6,952 7,531 7,583 8,294 9,096 9,957 9,990
*Since the Government of Dubai does not publish offi  cial data regarding the number of tourists, the number was calculated by 
summing up the number of guests in hotels and apartment-hotels.
–  No data available.
Sources: UNWTO, Compendium of Tourism Statistics, selected years, 2000-2014, Madrid; UNWTO, Tourism Highlights, selected years, 
2010-2014, Madrid; UNWTO, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, selected years, 2010-2014, Madrid; Government of Dubai, Statistical 
Yearbook, selected years, 2000-2013, Dubai. Government of Dubai, Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing (DTCM), 
Hotel Statistics. 
The eff ect of the Arab Spring on the tourism industry 
of the non-oil Arab countries 
As with other events, the reaction of the tourism industry to the onset of the Arab Spring was, simul-
taneously immediate and drastic. In the case of Egypt, the number of tourists declined from 13,758 
million in the FY2009/10 to 10,953 million in the FY2011/12, increased to 12,213 million in the 
FY2012/13 and again sharply declined to 7,968 million in FY2013/14 (see Table 3). Th e number of 
tourist nights declined respectively from 142,4 million in the FY2012/13 to 72,919 million in the 
FY2013/14. Th e result of the declining number of tourists from the developed economies and the 
overall price reductions implemented to maintain the industry alive, led to a substantial decline in the 
overall tourism receipts from a peak of $11,591 billion in FY2009/10 to $9,419 billion in FY2011/12; 
it recovered slightly to reach $9,752 billion in FY2012/13, and sharply declined to $5,073 billion only 
in the FY2013/14 (Central Bank of Egypt - CBE, Monthly Statistical Bulletin - MSB, March 2015). 
Although during the second half of 2014, there was some recovery in Egypt’s tourism performances 
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with the number of tourists reaching 5,5 million compared to 4,5 million in the corresponding period 
of the previous year (CBE, MSB, March 2014, March 2015), the Egyptian tourism industry is still 
much below its performance prior to the Arab Spring.
Table 3









































































Europe 3,501 2,769 3,469 4,965 5,983 5,818 6,853 9,120 10,439 8,791 8,101 8,925 5,059
Ameri-




304 217 253 349 386 432 534 561 652 560 374 441 243
Middle 
East 1,070 1,025 1,1179 1,736 1,743 1,834 1,697 1,666 1,635 1,636 1,739 2,094 1,071
Africa 145 144 168 221 258 280 342 428 462 482 434 438 365
Other 2 2 2 4 4 4 6 28 39 26 22 27 19
Total 5,347 4,341 5,239 7,512 8,650 8,693 9,788 12,293 13,758 11,931 10,953 12,213 7,968
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2002-2015, selected issues, Cairo. 
Th e most severe impact of the Arab Spring on the tourism industry was on that of Tunisia. Th is was 
due mainly to the national composition of its tourists, made up mainly of Europeans and Libyans. 
Th us, Tunisian tourism receipts in 2011 declined by as much as one-third compared to 2010 (Central 
Bank of Tunisia - CBT, 2012; Freedman, 2012). Only 3 million tourists visited Tunisia in 2011, in 
contrast with more than 7 million in each of the three years preceding the collapse of the Ben ‘Ali regime 
(Achy, 2012). In 2012, similar to Egypt, the Tunisian tourism activities also recovered considerably 
with a 33% increase in their revenue from tourism compared to 2011 (UNWTO, 2013a; CBT, 2013). 
However, in 2013 the Tunisian tourism industry had already fallen back into stagnation following the 
murder of Chokri Belaid  on  February 6, as well as attacks by some Islamist fundamentalists on tour-
ist sites, such as in Hergla, in early April 2013 (Saidani, 2013; Tunis Times, 2013).Th e deterioration 
in the Tunisian tourism fi gures continued in 2014 as well: according to Tunisian data, from January 
1, until December 20, Tunisia hosted 5,9 million tourists, representing a decline of 2.8% compared 
to the corresponding period of the previous year and a decline of as much as 12% compared to 2010 
(Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, January 8, 2015). 
In Jordan as well, despite the survival of the Hashemite regime, the Arab Spring brought about a sharp 
decline in tourism activities. Th is was because a large segment of the Jordanian tourism industry is 
made up of regional tours. In 2011, Jordan’s tourism receipts declined by 16.3% compared to 2010 
(Jordan, MTA, 2011b) while the number of tourist arrivals fell by 22% (EBRD, 2012). In 2012, the 
number of hotel nights increased by 5.1% compared to that of 2011 (Arabian Travel Market, February 
10, 2013), while the total income from tourism increased by as much as 13.5% (Bank Audi, 2013). 
Th e slight recovery of the Jordanian tourism industry, as that of Egypt and Tunisia, was largely a result 
of declining prices as well as the widespread feeling that from then on the security situation would 
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improve. Th is, however, never materialized and in both 2013 and 2014 the Jordanian tourism activi-
ties “continued to hobble” with the number of tourists in 2014 amounting to 3.1 million, while the 
tourism receipts declined by more than 20% compared to 2012 (Jordan, MTA, 2013, 2014).
In the case of Syria, since mid-2011 the tourism industry, which had enjoyed relative prosperity in the 
three years preceding the outbreak of the civil war, totally collapsed. In early 2012, the Syrian civil war 
has been spilling over into Lebanon. Th us, while in 2010 a record of 2,168 million international tourists 
visited Lebanon, their number fell to 1,656 million in 2011and dropped further to 1,366 million in 
2012. Th is decline continued in 2013 with the number of tourists reaching some 1,274 million only, 
namely a fall of 41% compared to the number in 2012 (Lebanon, Ministry of Tourism, 2011, 2012, 
2013). Th e main reason for the deterioration in Lebanon’s tourism is the political instability both in 
Lebanon itself and in neighboring Syria (MEED, 2013 Economic Review, 2013). Travel advisories, 
particularly those issued by the GCC authorities, warning citizens to avoid visiting Lebanon, were the 
fi nal deathblow to the Lebanese tourism industry (Al-Jazeera, 2013).
Morocco is the only exception among the non-oil Arab countries regarding its tourism industry in light 
of the Arab Spring. In 2011, Morocco was the only non-oil Arab country whose tourism industry not 
only emerged unharmed, but even slightly improved (MedPro, 2013), while the direct contribution 
of the tourism industry to its GDP amounted to 8.9% (Bouzahzah & El Menyari, 2013). In 2012, 
the Moroccan tourism industry continued to expand, but again at a very slow pace. In 2013, as seen 
in Table 2, the number of tourists in Morocco amounted to more than 10 million – higher than ever 
before. Th e expansion of the Moroccan tourism industry continued in 2014 as well, with the number 
of tourists reached 10,280 million, an increase of 4.2% compared to 2013 (Morocco World News, 
February 6, 2015).  
Why is the crisis following the Arab Spring unique? 
Historically, only two types of major tourism crises have occurred in the Arab region prior to the Arab 
Spring. Th e fi rst was the result of attacks on tourists by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. Such attacks 
took place at least once in almost all Arab countries – except for the GCC countries. In Egypt, for 
example, such events occurred in Luxor in November 1997 and again in October 2004 in the Hilton 
Hotel in Taba as well as in April 2005 in Cairo. Another example is Jordan where, in a coordinated 
operation, three hotels in Amman (the Radisson SAS, the Grand Hyatt and the Days Inn) were attacked 
simultaneously on November 9, 2005. Th ese attacks, like all the others, targeted the “soft under-belly” 
of these regimes. Not only did they signifi cantly damage the most lucrative private sector, they also 
humiliated the regimes in question by exposing their failure to maintain high eff ective levels of security. 
Th e second type of tourism crisis was induced by bilateral or regional wars, such as the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, the US invasion of Iraq and, lastly, the Second Lebanese War. Th e aforementioned crises 
and others had three characteristics in common: (a) All of them were relatively short; (b) None of these 
crises entailed internal political instability; (c) Above all, in the wake of these crises a signifi cantly large 
fi nancial package was given, either via inter-Arab support or externally mainly by the US.
Consequently, within a relatively short period of time, all tourism sectors mentioned above showed 
a fast recovery. In Jordan, for example, in 2001 the number of international tourist arrivals reached 
1,427 million, stagnated at around 1,478 million in 2002 due to the events of September 11 and rose 
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to 1,622 million in 2003. In Egypt the number of international tourists totaled 5,116 million in 2000 
and then declined markedly to 4,357 million in 2001. However, a rapid recovery took place in 2002 
with 4,906 million tourist arrivals in that year (WTO, 2003). Furthermore, after the attack in Luxor 
in November 1997, the Egyptian tourism industry quickly recovered, reaching 4,490 million tourist 
arrivals in 1999 compared to 3,213 in the previous year (World Bank Data, International Tourism, 
Number of Arrivals).
Th e current tourism crisis resulting from the Arab Spring is substantially diff erent from all types of 
previous tourism crises mentioned above. Th is is mainly due to the following three reasons: (a) Th e 
duration of the crisis. Not only has the aftermath of the Arab Spring been going on for more than four 
years, there is no sign of it ending in the foreseeable future.  (b) Th e image factor. In the tourism crises 
prior to the Arab Spring, the secular regimes of the countries aff ected were perceived as the victims of 
the Islamic fundamentalist attacks. Th is generated a sort of empathy, which helped the recovery pro-
cess. However, in the current on-going crises the new regimes are perceived as the core of the problem 
itself. (c) Th e lack of available foreign aid to support and re-activate tourist fl ows. Since the new regimes 
are perceived as the core of the problem, it is quite clear why the ruling GCC countries are reluctant 
to donate signifi cant fi nancial aid to the countries aff ected with the exception of Jordan and recently 
also Egypt. 
The Arab non-oil governments’ reaction to the Arab Spring tourism crises 
Th e non-oil Arab regimes have adopted four crisis management strategies in pursuit of damage reduc-
tion to the tourism sectors:
Improving the image and the perceived level of risk. Th us, both the new regimes of Egypt and Tunisia are 
constantly emphasizing that their countries are safe to visit. For them, creating a sense of security is 
crucial, particularly because their major tourism product is Triple-S. Th us, for example, on September 
19, 2013, Egyptian security forces stormed the tourist town of Kerdasa (about 4.5 kilometers from 
Giza’s Great Pyramids) that had turned into an Islamist stronghold. Also in Tunisia and Jordan the 
authorities have installed substantial security measures in order to restore a sense of security for tour-
ists. One of the noted advantages that helped in regaining a feeling of safety and security is that these 
countries are known for their relatively low rates of street crime. Th is fact has been constantly used as 
part of their safety image campaign.
To create a clear division between the political events and the tourism industry. Th e idea was to convey 
to potential tourists a message that the political changes had nothing to do with the tourism industry 
which would continue to operate as it had prior to the Arab Spring. Th us, for example, in November 
2011 the Egyptian Tourism Authority adopted the slogan: “We are friendly. We are open-minded. We are 
proud of our country. We are Egypt. See you soon in Egypt” (Rosenberg, 2011). Th e Tunisian authorities 
acted similarly and in early 2012 launched a new tourism promotion campaign under the slogan of 
“Rediscover Tunisia” (Ghanmi, 2012). 
Disguise the Islamist characteristics in order not to deter potential secular non-Muslim tourists from com-
ing. Th is strategy was predominantly used by Tunisia. Although there were some who called for “halal 
(permitted) tourism” in which men and women do not mix and no consumption of alcohol in public 
would be allowed but, to date, the Tunisian regime has not imposed any restrictions on tourists. 
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Price reduction. Another strategy widely used during and immediately after a crisis adversely aff ecting 
tourism is price reduction. Th is strategy was implemented, for example, when Egypt tried to convince 
tour operators worldwide to resume selling Egypt’s Triple-S, mainly in Sinai and the Red Sea beach 
resorts (Smith, 2013; Khazan, 2012). Th e marketing campaign based on price cuts was intensifi ed fol-
lowing the coups d’état of July 2013 (Ragab, 2013). In Tunisia, also, hundreds of hotels have slashed 
their prices, seeking to win back the Europeans who plumped for Spain, the Balkans and Turkey for 
their holiday (Field, 2012).
In summation, despite the tremendous eff orts made by the non-oil Arab countries to keep the tourism 
sector out of the political turmoil, since early 2011 this sector has lost a considerable part of its busi-
ness – a direct outcome of the political instability and turmoil known as the Arab Spring.
The great winners: 
Tourism expansion in the GCC Countries since the onset of the Arab Spring 
In the GCC countries, as opposed to the situation in the non-oil Arab countries, the tourism industry 
since the onset of the “Arab Spring” has been fl ourishing. Th e most prominent increase occurred in 
Dubai in which the number of hotel guest nights increased sharply from 20,5 million in 2007 to 41,6 
million in 2013 (see Table 4). Th is extraordinary increase occurred despite both the global economic 
recession and the Arab Spring. In 2013, the tourist arrivals in Dubai’s amounted to more than 11 
million (see Table 5), while hotel revenues increased accordingly, reaching $5,96 billion, an increase 
of 16.1% compared to 2012 (Nagraj, 2014).
Table 4




hotel apartments - Guests
Hotel and hotel 











 2012 9,957,162 37,445,453
2013 11,012,487 41,578,768
Sources: Government of Dubai, Department of Tourism and Commerce 
Marketing (DTCM); Government of Dubai, Dubai Statistics Center. 
In 2013, the hotel occupancy rate in Dubai reached 80%, despite the fact that in 2012 accommodation 
capacity had been expanded by 12 new hotels with more than 4,000 rooms (MEED, April 25-May 
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1, 2014). Th e rapid expansion of Dubai’s tourism activity continued in 2014 as well. According to 
data recently published by DTCM, the number of hotel guests amounted to 11,6 million, while the 
number of hotel guest nights reached 44,66 million (Sambidge, 2015).  Also in all other emirates of 
the UAE there was a marked expansion of the tourism industry in both 2013 and 2014 (MEED, May 
30-June 5, 2014). 
Table 5

















































































2002 388,832 1,057,847 500,856 1,042,146 67,801 283,407 1,203,194 212,197 4,756,280
2003 396,101 1,025,383 523,673 1,177,725 78,444 276,683 1,294,885 207,334 4,980,228
2004 327,035 1,049,006 491,698 1,221,837 103,850 278,401 1,713,802 235,095 5,420,724
2005 327,131 1,211,407 564,634 1,276,901 147,615 332,632 1,940,255 359,428 6,160,003
2006 321,077 1,040,939 597,695 1,414,406 187,546 395,372 2,044,572 440,063 6,441,670
2007 385,821 984,604 589,664 1,563,897 211,428 426,485 2,246,273 543,626 6,951,798
2008 436,578 831,400 592,216 1,800,460 243,081 462,913 2,497,683 666,968 7,531,299
2009 770,614 905,647 614,755 1,814,098 189,092 447,126 2,247,240 594,507 7,583,079
2010 862,250 1,102,353 633,524 2,041,416 206,176 465,661 2,342,698 640,055 8,294,132
2011 966,829 1,583,955 685,819 2,163,633 222,638 520,716 2,329,078 622,902 9,095,570
2012 980,421 1,962,093 743,322 2,165,824 232,845 464,846 2,624,211 683,599 9,957,161
2013 1,022,799 2,249,348 900,769 3,241,968 2,873,709 723,894 11,012,487
Sources: Government of Dubai, Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing (DTCM); Government of Dubai, Dubai Statistics 
Center. 
In the case of Bahrain, despite the massive opposition protests by the Shi’a during 2011, the tourism 
industry suff ered only from a temporary decline. By 2013, as seen in Table 6, the number of hotel 
guest nights amounted to almost two million – higher than ever before.
Table 6
Number of hotel guests and hotel guest nights 
in Bahrain, 2010-2013





Source: Kingdom of Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization 
(2011-2013).
In Oman as well, as shown in Table 7, the number of hotel guests in 2012 was higher by almost 10% 
compared to 2011 and by 12.6% compared to 2010. In 2013, Oman’s tourism sector grew by 10%, 
while the number of tourists reached 2,1 million (Times of Oman, February 16, 2014). Overall, a 
total of 24 new hotels were opened throughout Oman in 2013, bringing the number of hotels to 282 
with 14,400 rooms (Muscutdaily.com, August 13, 2014).
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Table 7







Asia America Europe Total
2010 593,150 172,406 263,461 71,416 385,378 1,631,254
2011 664,577 163,007 308,060 56,763 350,790 1,678,359
2012 822,235 169,947 343,376 47,154 298,462 1,838,565
Source: Sultanate of Oman, National Centre for Statistics and Information (2013).  
Th e Qatari tourism industry also expanded rapidly despite the events of the Arab Spring. By 2012, 
Qatar’s tourism industry expanded by as much as 12% (Scott, 2013). In 2013, the number of tourists 
in Qatar  reached 1,3 million compared to 1,2 million in 2012 ( Th e Gulf Times, 2014a).Tourism 
data recently released reveal that the total number of tourists in Qatar increased by as much as 26% in 
the fi rst quarter of 2014 as compared to the same period in 2013 (Gulf Times, 2014b). 
What is the “secret” of the success of the GCC tourism industry? 
Th is rapid expansion of the GCC tourism raises a question regarding the factors behind this success 
– and how is this success related to the Arab Spring? Th ese issues will be discussed below:
A rapidly expanding of the domestic tourism market. While the domestic tourism markets in the non-oil 
Arab countries are poor due to the low income of the vast majority of the local population, in the GCC 
countries, the purchasing power of the nationals is very high. Moreover, since the traditional vacation 
sites in the non-oil Arab countries, mainly Beirut, Cairo and Amman, have become less attractive since 
the onset of the Arab Spring, an increasing number of GCC nationals prefer to take their vacations in 
one of the GCC tourism sites. In the case of Dubai, in recent years, the largest increase in hotel guest 
nights was generated by GCC nationals. Th is trend of massive increase in the domestic tourism can be 
found in Qatar as well. In 2012, the number of non-Qatari GCC tourists in Qatar increased by 13% 
compared to their number in 2011 (Scott, 2013). According to data released by QTA (Qatar Tourism 
Authority), in 2013 the number of tourists from the other GCC countries increased by 5% (Th e Gulf 
Times, 2014b). In Oman, also, there was an marked increase in the percentage of GCC nationals in 
hotel guest night fi gures (see Table 7).
Indeed, this policy of promoting domestic tourism has proved to be a great success. In January 2012, 
Dubai was leading globally in terms of hotel occupancy rates with 86% on average (MEED, April 
20-26, 2012). In late December 2011 and early January 2012, during the Christmas holiday season, 
in the Burj al-Arab hotel (with an average room rate per night of $1,983), the occupancy rate reached 
81% - much above the global average at this season (Th e Middle East, April 2012). Overall, in 2012, 
Dubai’s hotel occupancy rate was 78% compared with 70% in both 2009 and 2010 (Dubai, DTCM, 
2013b). Also in Qatar the hotel occupancy rate surged from 68% during the fi rst quarter of 2013 to 
75% in the corresponding period of 2014 (Th e Gulf Times, 2014b). 
Rapid growth of GCC nationals. Th e demographic trend of the GCC nationals is unique. Th is is be-
cause they maintain high fertility rates despite the extremely low death rates. Overall, by 2010, the 
GCC national populations numbered 23,6 million compared to 11,4 million in 1994 with growth 
137-268 Tourism 2015 02EN.indd   215 27.5.2015.   12:00:01
216TOURISM ReviewYoel Mansfeld / Onn Winckler
Vol. 63/ No. 2/ 2015/ 205 - 223
rates amounting to more than 2.5% on an annual average (Winckler, 2012). Th us, the combination 
of a higher number of nationals and a much higher per capita income produces a signifi cantly larger 
market for domestic tourism in the GCC countries. 
Political stability. One of the most familiar impressions regarding the GCC countries is their political 
stability. Th e regimes of these countries have remained stable since their establishment. With the ex-
ception of the Shi’a opposition in Bahrain and that of al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia, the other four GCC 
countries have not seen real political opposition. However, the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
are also strong and there is no real threat to these two monarchies either.   
An extremely low crime rate. Th e GCC countries have an extremely low crime rate - one of the lowest 
worldwide – particularly against tourists. Th us, the widespread phenomenon in the major international 
tourism sites of crime against tourists such as robbery or pickpocketing or even cheating by taxi drivers 
or in restaurants is extremely rare in the GCC countries. Th e global economic recession has naturally 
led to an increase of street crimes, particularly against tourists. Th e extremely low crime rates thus 
constitute an indisputable advantage of the GCC tourism. 
Th e geographical location. Th e GCC countries have the advantage of geographical proximity to Europe 
as well as being situated more or less halfway between Europe and the Far East. Th eir location permits 
them to host a substantial number of inbound tourists on the basis of short stop-over breaks for long-
haul travelers. Th us, the GCC countries, without exception, have decided to transform their airports 
into unique tourism destinations in themselves. Dubai International Airport (DIA) has become one 
of the busiest in the world. In 2012, passenger traffi  c in DIA amounted to 57,7 million and reached 
70,5 million in 2014 (DIA homepage). Th e Duty Free Centre in Dubai has grown to become one of 
the largest worldwide. In mid-2013, the tourism and aviation industries contributed 28% of Dubai’s 
total GDP (MEED, “Dubai Aviation 2013”). Doha International Airport (DIA), like that of Dubai, 
has become in recent years one of the most sophisticated worldwide with its “Premium Terminal” 
off ering travelers an opportunity to relax and unwind in comfort and to avail themselves of facilities 
stretching from spa treatments, a business center and for the young ones, a nursery (DIA homepage). 
In April 2014, Doha’s new Hamad International Airport (HIA), was opened with two of the longest 
runways worldwide, aiming to accommodate 50 million passengers per year (HIA homepage; MEED, 
July 4-10, 2014). In light of these developments, it is no wonder that so many companies are fl ying 
so frequently to the Gulf.
Th e strategic decision of the GCC authorities to develop the tourism industry into a leading sector. Since the 
mid-1990s, but more so in recent years, the GCC authorities, without exception, decided to become a 
worldwide leading tourism destination (Mansfeld & Winckler, 2007). Even Saudi Arabia, which had 
originally rejected the idea of hosting international tourism other than the Hajj pilgrims, changed its 
traditional policy and gradually started to promote “Hajj extra” for Muslims which would combine 
the religious duty of the Hajj with visiting other Saudi sites. Within the framework of religious tour-
ism, the Saudis built a large number of fi rst class hotels in the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 
In October 2013, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved the new tourism law aimed at improving 
tourism facilities in order to convert the tourism industry into a more signifi cant contributor to the 
Saudi economy (Saudi Gazette, 2013). During the past few years, the smaller emirates of the UAE also 
started to invest in tourism development. Ras al-Khaimah, for example, has invested in hotel building, 
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aiming to complete 10,000 hotel rooms by 2016. In Fujairah as well, several hotels are currently under 
construction (MEED, November 30-December 6, 2012). 
Th e image of the GCC as a totally safe destination for private investments. Due to the real negative interest 
rates in all the developed economies, private investors are constantly looking for profi table channels. 
Th e image of the GCC countries as a safe destination serves as a crucial factor to attract an immense 
number of private investments, including in the tourism arena.    
GCC tourism policy 
Th e above successful factors have been integrated into the GCC tourism policy that depends on three 
fundamental elements:
A rapid expansion of tourism facilities and diversifi cation of the tourist products. Th us, in recent years in 
each of the GCC countries one can fi nd massive investments in tourism infrastructures, hotels and 
sophisticated tourist attractions. In the case of Dubai, for example, under “Dubai Airports Strategic 
Plan 2020,” the Emirate plans to invest $7,8 billion to boost DIA’s capacity from 60 million passengers 
at present to 90 million by 2018 (Kan, 2012; MEED, “Dubai Aviation 2013”). However, Dubai In-
ternational Airport is not big enough to handle the rapid increase in the number of passengers through 
Dubai, and despite the new Terminal Th ree, in 2018, the airport will reach its maximum capacity. For 
this reason, the 160 million-capacity supersize airport at Jabel Ali, Al-Maktoum International Airport, 
is currently under construction within the overall framework of Dubai World Center (DWC). Th is 
new mega-sized airport will supply a long-term solution to Dubai’s future aviation needs. Th e airport 
was offi  cially opened for passenger fl ights in late October 2013 (DWC, 2015). Dubai’s tourism vi-
sion is to boost the number of tourists to 20 million in 2020 and to triple the tourism contribution 
to the GDP to more than $81 billion (MEED, May 31-June 6, 2013). A prominent tool used as part 
of the overall tourism diversifi cation process is the cruise industry which has developed rapidly in the 
Gulf region in recent years. In 2013, in Dubai alone did the number of cruise passengers amount to 
400,000 compared to 6,000 in 2001. Also Oman and Abu Dhabi are currently developing their own 
cruise terminals (MEED, April 25-May 1, 2014). 
Also the other GCC countries are investing massively in the development of tourism facilities while 
off ering an attractive terms for private investors in the tourism industry. In February 24, 2014, Issa 
bin Mohammed Al Mohannadi, Chairman of QTA, offi  cially unveiled the “Qatar National Tourism 
Sector Strategy 2030.” Th e aim of the plan is that by 2030 the tourism sector will contribute 5.1% to 
Qatar’s GDP (up from 2.6% in 2013) while the number of tourists will reach the 7 million mark. To 
achieve this ambitious aim, the Qatari authorities and the private sector will allocate between $40 and 
$45 billion (QTA website; MEED, April 25-May 1, 2014). Within Oman’s overall long-term economic 
policy - “Oman 2020” - the tourism sector is planning to contribute 9.2% of the total Sultanate’s 
GDP up from 6.7% in 2010 (Gutcher, 2013). Also Bahrain is investing heavily in order to transform 
tourism into a leading sector, particularly as a generator of suitable employment opportunities for its 
rapidly increasing national workforce (Euromonitor International, 2013).
Creating extremely distinctive tourism attractions. Th is, for example, was the offi  cial policy being imple-
mented for Dubai’s tourism philosophy (Stephenson & Ali-Knight, 2010). Th us, everything in Dubai 
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follows this form: Th e best hotel in the world (i.e., Burj al-Arab); the tallest hotel in the world (the 
Rotana Rose Tower, located in the tallest building in the world, Burj Khalifa) and so on. Qatar started 
from the beginning to present itself as a fi rst-class international tourism destination, cut off  from the 
“harsh outside world.” In other words, “Qatar is heaven on earth, but for rich people only.” Th e Omani 
tourism policy is also focused on bringing in quality tourists rather than quantity.
Transforming the Gulf into a global center for the most prestigious and hallmark international sport events 
and a leading center for international conferences and trade fairs. In December 2010, Qatar made inter-
national headlines when it won the right to host the FIFA Football World Cup in 2022. Th e major 
aim of the Qataris is to use the World Cup games to show the world what Qatar has to off er to tourists 
and through tourism to diversify its economy (MEED, January 13-19, 2012).
A major sports events tool for transforming the Gulf into a fi rst-class global sports center was, and 
still is, the sponsoring of international and famous football clubs. In 2005, the Emirates airline signed 
a record $162 million deal with the English football club, Arsenal. As part of the deal, the name of 
the home ground was changed to “Emirates Stadium.” In December 2010, the state-owned Qatar 
Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development signed a $40 million per year deal 
with Barcelona football club. In March 2012, the Qatar Investment Authority took full ownership of 
Paris Saint-Germain football club (MEED, April 27-May 3, 2012).
Another major tool for transforming the Gulf countries into sophisticated and unique tourism sites 
is to host major international prestigious events. Th e Qatar Motor show held in Doha on an annual 
basis is a good example of this policy. In this exhibition, one cannot fi nd regular cars – only the most 
expensive ones. 
Th e combination of a rapid increase of the domestic tourism industry, the distancing itself from the 
unrest of the Arab Spring, the rapid spread of an image projecting a prestigious tourism destination, 
the low crime rate, and the unique weather, all these together ensure the continuation of a rapid de-
velopment of the GCC tourism sectors. 
Discussion and summary 
Using a macroeconomic approach, this paper reviewed and analyzed the tourism-economic ramifi cations 
of the Arab Spring and the global economic recession that started in the late 2000s as they aff ected two 
groups of Arab countries: Th e non-oil and the GCC states. Th e analysis showed that while the non-oil 
Arab countries, which experienced socio-political and economic problems and had to cope with tourism 
crises, the GCC countries have managed to boost their tourism performances very rapidly. Th e postulate 
that the non-oil Arab countries could have benefi ted from this culturally and politically sympathetic 
market and use it as a strategic crisis-management tool, as  happened in previous tourism crises, had to 
be rejected. Due to travel warnings and other factors, tourists of the GCC countries preferred to travel 
domestically within the Gulf area. Th at was the reason for the sharp increase in the number of hotel 
guest nights of GCC nationals in recent years. Furthermore, the non-oil Arab countries lost non-Arab 
international visits to the GCC countries. Th is was an economic loss that needs to be evaluated not 
only in terms of the number of arrivals, but as a fi nancial loss of high-end affl  uent tourists. 
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Th e paper also revealed some interesting insights refl ecting on issues of tourism crises and recovery, on 
the image of destinations facing socio-political unrest and on the infl uence of a multiple crisis situation 
environment (the Arab Spring and the global economic recession),  as well as the ability to confront a 
tourism slowdown that may deteriorate into a full-scale crisis. While current literature has contributed 
a variety of explanations for the characteristics and dynamics of tourism crises (e.g.; Mansfeld & Pizam, 
2006; Avraham & Ketter, 2008; Beirman, 2009) it has not yet looked at the economic resilience of a 
specifi c country as an explanatory factor of crises in the world of tourism.
In this respect, the trigger for these tourism crises is very similar to that in other countries which have 
gone through comparable socio-political turmoil. Th e cases of the recent economic crisis in Greece, 
the recent demonstrations in Istanbul, Madrid and in Th ailand and the four coups d’état in Fiji in 
the last two decades are just a few examples. As Saha and Yap (2014) have recently concluded, socio-
political events may have not only a devastating impact on tourism, but their severity and contribution 
to tourism crises is much more serious than security-related ones. Th e fi ndings of this paper support 
their conclusion and suggest that the focus of future research should shift from security-induced tour-
ism crises to fi nding mitigation strategies dealing more specifi cally with the impact of socio-political 
unrest on tourism crises.
Another interesting fi nding is that the image of Arab countries as (un)safe destinations due to the 
Arab Spring aff ected the two country groups diff erentially. Th us, the negative image developed in 
the wake of the Arab Spring has not spilled over into the GCC countries. On the contrary, the Arab 
Spring not only emphasized the already-known fact that there is no longer an “Arab region” or “Arab 
world” but, rather, there are separate Arab countries while the GCC has become a kind of “miniature 
Arab League.” Hence, the GCC countries not only remained untouched by the deteriorating image of 
countries involved in the Arab Spring, but even gained tourists fl ows redirected to them both by Arab 
and international tourists. Th us, one could say that the “pain” of the tourism industry of the non-oil 
Arab countries was, to a large extent, the “gain” of the GCC tourism industry. 
Th is fi nding somewhat contradicts the observations of previous studies, claiming that there is always 
some spillover of negative images from aff ected countries to others that have nothing to do with a given 
confl ict. Th e literature attributed this “spillover eff ect” (Hoti, McAleer & Shareel, 2007) to geographi-
cally over-generalized media coverage on the one hand, and geographic illiteracy among some tourists, 
on the other. Th us, place-specifi c tourism crises are geographically framed using terms such as “Th e 
Middle East” or “Th e Arab Spring.” As such, they can easily mislead potential tourists and project lo-
cal confl icts on to much larger tourism spaces. Oddly enough, such a spillover eff ect may have taken 
place within the non-oil Arab countries but did not adversely aff ect the GCC states.
It is important to note that this paper used a macroeconomic approach and thus the method of data 
collection was based on secondary statistical data, reports on the tourism crises in daily newspapers and 
on “gray” sources, such as internal reports of public organizations. Using this blend of data allowed 
only descriptive statistical analysis to be used. Th e broad picture obtained from these data facilitated a 
comparative analysis of the two groups within the Arab countries. However, further research charac-
terizing the specifi c infl uence of the Arab Spring on the “tourism DNA” of each of the countries will 
require primary data generated by interviews with tourism stakeholders in each country and more 
detailed secondary data on each country’s tourism performance.
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